MAR  23   i914 


FACTS  OF  INTEREST 

CONCERNING  THE  MILITARY 

RESOURCES  AND  POLICY 


OF  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


WASHINGTON 
1914 


FACTS  OF  INTEREST 

CONCERNING  THE  MILITARY 

RESOURCES  AND  POLICY 


OF  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


WASHINGTON 
1914 


*^  ••.  •' 


^> 


^^ 


FOREWORD. 


War  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 

Washington,  January  20,  1914. 
Considerable  interest  has  been  shown  in  the  subjects  of  miUtary 
instruction  in  colleges,  military  reserves,  methods  of  enlistment,  and 
the  exact  nature  of  the  measures  either  now  in  force  or  contemplated 
to  safeguard  the  Nation. 

This  interest  is  indicated  by  many  letters,  particularly  from  college 
presidents,  editors,  etc.,  requesting  a  brief  statement  of  the  latest 
official  and  reliable  data  on  the  above  subjects. 

Believing  the  information  would  be  of  value  to  all  thinking  per- 
sons interested  in  the  continued  peace  and  welfare  of  our  country, 
the  following  is  sent  out  for  use,  if  desired,  as  a  ready  reference  on 
the  subjects  treated. 

Leonard  Wood, 
Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


320138 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


OomTnander  in  Chief, 

WOODROW  WILSON,  PREsroBNT. 

Secretary  of  War, 

LINDLEY  M.  GARRISON. 


ACT   OP  APRIL   22,  1898.      30   STAT.  L.,  361. 

''All  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  persons  of 
foreign  birth,  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citi- 
zens *  *  *  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five  years,  are 
hereby  declared  to  constitute  the  national  forces,  and  with  such 
exceptions  and  under  such  conditions  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law, 
shall  be  liable  to  perform  military  duty  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States." 

''The  organized  and  active  land  forces  of  the  United  States  shall 
consist  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  militia  of  the 
several  States  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States," 

"The  Regular  Army  is  the  permanent  military  establishment  which 
is  maintained  both  in  peace  and  war,  according  to  law." 

Organization  of  the  Army. 

The  Regular  Army  now  has  an  authorized  strength  of  approxi- 
mately 84,000  men  and  4,746  officers.  This  should  not  be  confused 
with  the  fighting  strength,  which  is  necessarily  much  less,  as  will  be 
shown  later.  Neither  should  it  be  assumed  that  this  is  the  actual 
strength,  for  nearly  all  organizations  have  more  or  less  vacancies  at 
all  times. 

The  primary  classification  of  the  Army  is  as  follows : 

1.  The  mobile  army,  or  that  which  should  be  capable  of  moving 
any  place  on  land  for  attack  or  defense,  and  should  be  organized 
into  properly  proportioned,  well- trained,  and  cohesive  brigades  and 
divisions. 

2.  The  Coast  Artillery,  which  mans  the  guns  of  our  coast  defenses. 

5 


6  MILITABY  POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES. 

THE    MOBILE    ARMY. 

The  great  bulk  of  such  an  army  is  infantry.  These  are  the  men 
whose  means  of  transportation  are  their  own  feet,  and  who  carry 
their  own  weapons,  ammunition,  shelter,  and  food,  and  who,  on  the 
march  and  in  combat,  bear  the  heaviest  burdens  and  losses.  Begin- 
ning with  the  higher  units,  the  Infantry  is  organized  into  brigades  of 
three  regiments  each.  The  brigade  is  commanded  by  a  brigadier 
general.  The  regiment,  commanded  by  a  colonel,  is  made  up  of 
three  battalions.  Each  hattalion,  under  command  of  a  major,  con- 
sists of  four  companies.  The  company  is  the  command  of  a  captain, 
who  is  assisted  by  two  lieutenants;  it  is  the  smallest  administrative 
unit,  but  for  purposes  of  training  and  combat  is  divided  into  platoons 
and  squads  under  the  lieutenants,  sergeants,  and  corporals.  As  a 
part  of  each  regiment  there  is  a  band,  a  machine-gun  platoon  having 
two  automatic  guns,  and  some  mounted  scouts. 

Intimately  associated  with  the  Infantry  as  a  fighting  arm  is  the 
Field  Artillery.  This  arm  has  as  a  weapon  the  large-caliber, 
long-range  guns,  so  essential  as  a  support  to  the  Infantry  in  combat. 
The  largest  unit  we  have  at  present  is  the  regiment,  commanded  by 
a  colonel.  The  regiment  consists  of  two  battalions,  each  under  a 
major.  The  battalion  is  made  up  of  three  batteries,  each  being 
commanded  by  a  captain,  who  is  assisted  by  four  lieutenants.  Each 
battery  has  four  guns  and  twelve  caissons. 

We  have  artillery  of  different  kinds,  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  work  expected  of  it.  In  the  Jiorse  artillery  the  members  of  the 
battery  are  mounted  in  order  that  they  may  accompany  cavalry. 
In  the  mountain  artillery  the  guns  are  of  a  type  that  may  be  dis- 
mounted and,  with  the  ammunition,  carried  on  pack  mules. 

The  other  important  element  of  our  fighting  team  is  the  Cavalry. 
In  this  branch  the  weapons  and  organization  are  much  the  same  as 
in  the  Infantry,  but  the  men  are  mounted.  In  the  Cavalry  the 
three  subdivisions  of  the  regiment  are  known  as  squadrons,  and 
instead  of  companies  we  have  troops. 

In  addition  to  the  three  arms  already  mentioned  many  other  auxiliary 
troops  are  necessary  to  make  a  complete  fighting  force,  but  their 
numbers  are  very  much  less  than  the  three  arms  mentioned.  The 
Engineers  must  make  and  repair  roads  and  bridges,  construct  and 
demolish  fortifications,  and  perform  other  important  work.  Our 
present  force  of  these  troops  is  three  battalions  of  four  companies 
each.  The  Signal  Corps  operates  all  the  means  of  signaliag  and 
communication  from  the  flag  to  the  aeroplane.  The  highest  unit 
at  present  is  the  company,  which  is  organized  and  equipped  accord- 
ing to  the  duties  expected  of  it.  The  Medical  Department  are 
known  as  sanitary  troops,  and  may  either  be  assigned  to  special 


MILITARY  POLICY   OF   UNITED  STATES.  7 

units,  as  regiments,  etc.,  or  be  formed  into  ambulance  companies  or 
field  hospitals.  The  Quartermaster  Corps  furnishes  the  transpor- 
tation, rations,  and  shelter,  and  has  charge  of  the  payment  of  troops. 
The  men  of  the  corps  are  clerks,  bakers,  teamsters,  etc.  There  are 
also  other  staff  departments,  consisting  of  officers  only,  who  have 
charge  of  various  matters  pertaining  to  the  administration.  All  of 
these  have  duties  to  perform  in  connection  with  other  parts  of  our 
forces,  as  well  as  with  the  mobile  army. 

THE    COAST   ARTILLERY. 

This  branch  has  charge  of  our  seacoast  defenses,  and  about  all 
of  their  available  time  is  taken  up  in  training  them  in  their  highly 
technical  duties.  They  are  in  addition  armed  as  infantry,  and 
some  attempt  is  made  to  give  them  a  little  infantry  training,  but 
they  are  intended,  primarily,  for  coast  defense  and  can  not  properly 
be  considered  a  part  of  our  mobile  army. 

The  Coast  Artillery  is  organized  into  companies,  of  which  we  have 
170,  with  an  authorized  strength  of  104  men  each,  the  total  author- 
ized strength  of  this  arm  being  18,931. 


MILITARY  POLICY. 


1.  The  Traditional  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States. 

The  problem  of  military  organization  has  two  aspects,  a  dynamic 
aspect  and  a  political  aspect.  The  measure  of  military  force  required 
to  meet  any  given  emergency  is  purely  dynamic,  while  the  form  of 
military  institutions  must  be  determined  on  political  grounds,  with 
due  regard  to  national  genius  and  tradition.  There  can  be  no  sound 
solution  of  the  problem  ii  either  of  these  fundamental  aspects  be 
ignored.  The  military  pedant  may  fail  by  proposing  adequate  and 
economical  forces  under  forms  that  are  intolerable  to  the  national 
genius,  while  the  pohtical  pedant  may  propose  military  systems 
which  lack  nothing  except  the  necessary  element  of  trained  and  dis- 
ciplined military  force.  The  practical  military  statesman  must 
recognize  both  of  these  elements  of  the  problem.  He  does  not  pro- 
pose impracticable  or  foreign  institutions,  but  seeks  to  develop  the 
necessary  vigor  and  energy  within  the  familiar  institutions  that  have 
grown  with  the  national  life.  But  the  ultimate  test  is  dynamic.  In 
any  military  system  the  final  test  is  capacity  to  exert  superior  military 
force  in  time  to  meet  any  given  national  emergency. 

It  is  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  that  the  Military 
Establishment  in  time  of  peace  is  to  be  a  small  regular  army  and 
that  the  ultimate  war  force  of  the  Nation  is  to  be  a  great  army  of  citi- 
zen soldiers.  This  fundamental  theory  of  military  organization  is 
sound  economically  and  politically.  The  maintenance  of  armies  in 
time  of  peace  imposes  a  heavy  financial  burden  on  the  Nation,  and 
the  expenditure  for  this  purpose  should  be  kept  at  a  minimum  con- 
sistent with  effectiveness  for  war.  But  reliance  upon  citizen  soldiers 
is  subject  to  the  limitation  that  they  can  not  be  expected  to  meet  a 
trained  enemy  until  they,  too,  have  been  trained.  Our  history  is 
full  of  the  success  of  the  volunteer  soldier  after  he  has  been  trained 
for  war,  but  it  contains  no  record  of  the  successful  employment  of  raw 
levies  for  general  military  purposes. 

It  is  therefore  our  most  important  military  problem  to  devise  means 
for  preparing  great  armies  of  citizen  soldiers  to  meet  the  emergency 
of  modern  war.  The  organization  of  the  Regular  Army  is  but  a 
smaller  phase  of  this  problem.  It  is  simply  the  peace  nucleus  of  the 
greater  war  army,  and  its  strength  and  organization  should  always  be 
considered  with  reference  to  its  relation  to  the  greater  war  force  which 
8 


MILITABY  POLICY  OF  UNITED  STATES.  9 

can  not  be  placed  in  the  field  until  war  is  imminent.  Tlie  problem 
is  one  of  expansion  from  a  small  peace  force  to  a  great  war  force.  Its 
solution  therefore  involves  the  provision  of  a  sufficient  peace  nucleus, 
the  partial  organization  and  training  of  citizen  soldiers  in  peace,  and 
provisions  for  prompt  and  orderly  expansion  on  the  outbreak  of  war. 
But  the  practical  solution  of  the  problem  can  not  be  met  by  the 
promulgation  of  a  general  theory.  The  Army  at  any  time  and  place 
must  be  strong  enough  to  defeat  any  enemy  that  may  oppose  it  at 
that  time  and  place.  We  are  concerned  more  with  the  time  required 
to  raise  the  force  of  trained  troops  than  with  their  ultimate  numbers. 
If  we  need  60,000  soldiers  in  a  given  terrain  within  30  days  and  can 
only  deploy  50,000  soldiers  in  that  time  and  place,  we  are  not  pre- 
pared for  the  emergency  even  if  our  plans  provide  for  ten  times  that 
number  at  some  period  in  the  future.  Whatever  our  military  insti- 
tutions may  be,  we  must  recognize  the  fundamental  facts  that  victory 
is  the  reward  of  superior  force,  that  modern  wars  are  short  and  deci- 
sive, and  that  trained  armies  alone  can  defeat  trained  armies. 

2.  The  Time  Required  to  Raise  Armies. 

The  time  required  for  the  training  of  extemporized  armies  depends 
largely  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  trained  instructors.  If  there  be 
a  corps  of  trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  a  tested 
organization  of  higher  units  with  trained  leaders  and  staff  officers,  the 
problem  of  training  is  limited  to  the  training  of  the  private  soldier. 
This  can  be  accomplished  in  a  relatively  short  time,  and  under  such 
conditions  if  arms  and  equipment  are  available  a  respectable  army 
can  be  formed  within  six  months.  But  where  the  leaders  themselves 
are  untrained  and  where  officers  and  men  must  alike  stumble  toward 
efficiency  without  intelligent  guidance,  the  formation  of  an  efficient 
army  is  a  question  of  years.  Indeed  such  a  force  can  not  become  an 
army  at  aU  within  the  period  of  duration  of  modern  war.  As  the 
American  war  of  1861-1865  presents  the  singular  phenomenon  of  two 
extemporized  armies  gradually  developing  while  in  conflict  with  each 
other,  it  is  a  most  remarkable  record  of  the  evolution  of  such  forces. 
In  the  conflicts  of  1861  both  officers  and  men  were  untrained  for  the 
duties  demanded  of  them.  Even  the  companies  were  imperfectly 
organized  as  units  of  the  regiment,  and  the  lack  of  cohesion  was  still 
more  apparent  in  the  higher  units.  BuU  Run  disorganized  both 
armies.  One  was  demoralized  by  defeat  and  the  other  by  victory. 
By  1862  effective  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  had  come  into 
being,  but  the  conduct  and  leading  of  higher  units  as  a  rule  was  still 
imperfect.  It  was  not  until  1863  that  the  armies  confronted  each 
other  as  complete  and  effective  military  teams.  But  even  in  the 
early  stages  of  the  war  the  influence*of  trained  and  able  leaders  was 
23469°— 14 2 


10  MILITARY  POLICY  OF   UNITED   STATES. 

apparent.  The  time  required  to  make  an  effective  soldier  depends 
very  largely  on  the  organization  in  which  the  recruit  is  enrolled.  The 
recruit  of  1861  could  not  become  a  good  private  until  his  captain 
became  a  good  captain,  but  the  recruit  of  1863  was  absorbed  in  a  team 
already  trained,  and  therefore  became  a  trained  soldier  in  a  few 
months  of  active  service.  But  while  the  history  of  the  Civil  War  is 
instructive  as  a  record  of  military  evolution  it  can  not  be  invoked  as 
a  guide  of  military  policy,  for  we  can  count  upon  it  that  in  our  career 
as  a  world  power  no  serious  competitor  will  ever  oppose  us  with  ex- 
temporized armies. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  obvious  that  the  citizen  sol- 
dier must  have  some  training  in  peace  if  he  is  to  be  effective  in  the 
sudden  crisis  of  modern  war.  The  organization  in  which  he  is  to 
serve  must  exist  and  function  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  view  of  the 
limited  time  available  for  training  it  should  be  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  American  policy  that  no  officer  should  be  intrusted  with  the 
leadership  of  American  soldiers  who  has  not  prepared  himself  for 
that  responsibility  in  time  of  peace.  The  American  soldier,  whether 
regular  or  volunteer,  is  entitled  to  trained  leadership  in  war. 

It  will  never  be  possible  for  citizen  soldiers  to  acquire  thorough 
miUtary  training  and  experience  in  time  of  peace.  Their  training  and 
hardening  must  be  completed  after  mobilization,  but  the  period  re- 
quired for  such  final  training  will  be  reduced  exactly  in  proportion 
to  the  amount  of  training  already  received  in  time  of  peace.  If  the 
total  peace  training  of  a  National  Guard  company  is  equivalent  to 
two  months  in  the  field,  it  will  be  available  for  duty  at  the  front  two 
months  earlier  than  a  company  of  raw  men,  assuming  other  condi- 
tions equal  in  each  case;  but  in  any  event  during  the  period  of  final 
training,  which  wiU  vary  for  different  companies  and  regiments,  the 
Regular  Army  must  meet  the  situation  at  the  front.  If  our  citizen 
soldiery  is  put  on  a  proper  basis  as  to  organization  and  training — a 
basis  on  which  it  does  not  now  rest — ^its  regiments  will  soon  reenforce 
the  line.  Even  with  their  limited  peace  training  they  will  soon  be 
effective  for  defense,  and  after  a  short  period  of  field  practice  the 
best-officered  organizations  will  begin  to  expand  the  Army  for  gen- 
eral military  purposes. 

3.  Two  Classes  of  Citizen  Soldiery,  Organized  and 
Unorganized. 

The  traditional  army  of  citizen  soldiery  should  be  considered  as 
divided  into  two  distinct  classes,  as  follows: 

1.  The  organized  citizen  soldiery,  comprising  those  who  are  en- 
rolled in  definite  military  organizations  and  are  partially  trained  in 
peace.  This  force  is  now  known  as  the  National  Guard  and  is  organ- 
ized under  the  militia  clause  of  the  Constitution. 


MILITABY  POLICY   OF   UNITED  STATES.  11 

2.  The  unorganized  citizen  soldiery:  Included  in  this  class  is  the 
Reserve  Militia,  which  is  made  up  of  all  the  able-bodied  citizens  liable 
for  militia  duty,  but  who  are  not  enrolled  as  members  of  the  National 
Guard. 

In  the  past  the  citizens  liable  for  military  duty  have  served  the 
Federal  Government  under  three  distinct  conditions :  First,  by  being 
enrolled  into  a  militia  regiment  which  had  been  or  was  to  be  mus- 
tered into  the  service  of  the  United  States ;  second,  by  being  enrolled 
into  a  State  volunteer  regiment;  third,  by  being  enrolled  into  a 
United  States  volunteer  regiment. 

As  the  trained  armies  of  modern  nations  wiU  seek  a  decision  in 
the  early  stages  of  war,  and  as  extemporized  armies  wiU  rarely  be 
fit  for  use  within  the  brief  duration  of  such  a  conflict,  it  is  obvious 
that  our  military  policy  should  aim  at  increasing  the  peace  strength 
and  efficiency  of  the  organized  citizen  soldiery.  Provisions  should 
be  made  for  the  organization  of  such  new  volunteer  units  as  may  be 
necessary  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  but  it  should  always  be  the  goal 
of  sound  policy  to  form  the  proper  units  in  peace  so  that  the  war 
contingent  of  raw  recruits  can  be  absorbed  into  trained  teams  already 
in  existence.*  This  policy  must  be  based  upon  the  principle  that  a 
nation's  military  power  is  to  be  measured  not  by  the  total  number 
of  its  male  citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms  but  by  the  number  of 
trained  soldiers  with  which  it  can  meet  a  given  emergency. 

4.  Relation  of  the  Regular  Army  to  the  Nation's  War  Power. 

From  a  general  consideration  of  our  institutions  and  the  require- 
ments of  modern  war  it  thus  appears  that  the  Regular  Army  is  sim- 
ply the  peace  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  Army  of  the  Nation.  Its 
strength  and  organization  should  therefore  be  determined  by  its  rela- 
tion to  the  larger  force.  It  must  form  a  definite  model  for  the  organi- 
zation and  expansion  of  the  great  war  Army,  and  it  must  also  be  pre- 
pared to  meet  sudden  and  special  emergencies  which  can  not  be  met 
by  the  army  of  citizen  soldiery.  Some  of  the  special  functions  of 
the  Regular  Army  are  indicated  below: 

1.  The  peace  garrisons  of  the  foreign  possessions  of  the  United 
States  must  be  detachments  of  the  Regular  Army. 

2.  The  peace  garrisons  of  our  fortified  harbors  and  naval  bases 
with  a  sufficient  nucleus  of  the  mobile  army  elements  of  coast  de- 
fense must  be  regular  troops,  definitely  organized  in  time  of  peace. 

3.  The  peace  establishment  of  the  Regular  Army  must  be  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  naval  raids,  which  under  modern  conditions  may 
precede  a  declaration  of  war.  A  successful  raid  of  this  character 
may  determine  the  initiative  by  giving  the  enemy  a  convenient  base 
for  future  operations. 


12  MILITARY  POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES. 

4.  The  Regular  Army  must  form  a  mobile  reserve  prepared  to  re- 
enforce  the  foreign  garrisons  during  periods  of  insurrection  and 
disorder. 

5.  The  Regular  Army  must  be  prepared  to  furnish  expeditionary 
forces  for  minor  wars  or  for  the  occupation  of  foreign  territory  where 
treaty  rights  or  fundamental  national  pohcies  are  threatened. 

6.  The  Regular  Army  must  be  prepared  to  cooperate  with  the 
Navy  in  the  formation  of  joint  expeditions  in  support  of  the  foreign 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  for  the  protection  of  American 
citizens  abroad. 

7.  At  the  outbreak  of  war  regular  forces  should  be  concentrated 
and  ready  to  seize  opportunities  for  important  initial  successes. 
Such  opportunities  will  frequently  be  offered  before  the  mobilization 
of  the  army  of  citizen  soldiers  can  be  completed. 

8.  At  the  outbreak  of  war  special  regular  detachments  should  be 
ready  to  seize  important  strategic  positions  before  they  can  be  occu- 
pied or  adequately  defended  by  the  enemy  and  before  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  of  citizen  soldiers  is  complete.  Initial  operations 
of  this  kind,  such  as  seizing  the  crossings  of  a  river  frontier  or  a  port 
of  embarkation,  frequently  determine  the  future  conduct  of  war  and 
assure  an  early  decision.  Capacity  to  take  the  initiative  with  an 
effective  force  is  the  best  preventive  of  war. 

9.  By  its  definite  organization  in  peace  the  Regular  Army  becomes 
the  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  Army.  By  its  peace  practice,  its 
varied  experience  on  foreign  service,  and  its  participation  in  expe- 
ditions the  Regular  Army  becomes  the  experimental  model  of  the 
Volunteer  Army.  It  solves  practical  problems  of  equipment,  arma- 
ment, and  supply,  and  makes  its  technical  experience  in  these  matters 
available  for  the  larger  force  which  is  normally  absorbed  in  peaceful 
occupations.  It  makes  our  war  problem  one  of  definite  and  orderly 
expansion  instead  of  the  vastly  more  difficult  problem  of  extem- 
porization. 

10.  The  Regular  Army  will  furnish  a  school  of  military  theory  and 
practice  and  will  develop  officers  with  special  equipment  and  training 
for  the  higher  staff  duties  in  war. 

11.  Through  its  professional  schools  and  General  Staff  the  Regular 
Army  will  develop  the  unified  mihtary  doctrine  and  policy  which 
must  permeate  the  entire  National  Army  if  it  is  to  succeed  in  war. 

12.  Through  its  administrative  and  supply  departments  the  Reg- 
ular Army  in  peace  will  prepare  in  advance  for  the  equipment,  trans- 
portation, and  supply  of  the  great  war  Army  of  the  Nation. 


MILITAKY   POLICY   OF   UNITED  STATES.  13 

The  Joint  Use  of  Kegulars  and  Citizen  Soldiery. 

In  the  defense  of  Great  Britain  regular  divisions  ^  and  territorial 
divisions  will  be  combined  in  field  armies  for  joint  action.  Any 
group  of  two  or  more  divisions  will  form  a  field  army.  This  permits 
the  two  forces  to  cooperate  fully  in  the  national  defense  and  yet  bases 
the  ultimate  grouping  of  the  divisions  on  the  undoubted  differences 
of  function  of  the  two  forces.  This  is  pointed  out  because  a  different 
theory  of  organization  has  been  proposed  ia  this  country,  based  on 
the  idea  of  mixiug  regular  troops  and  citizen  soldiery  ia  the  same 
divisions.  It  has  been  proposed  to  form  divisions  comprisiag  two 
brigades  of  regulars  and  one  brigade  of  citizen  soldiers  or  one  brigade 
of  regulars  and  two  brigades  of  citizen  soldiers,  with  various  other 
combinations  of  these  two  classes  of  troops.  A  slight  consideration 
will  show  the  fundamental  defects  of  this  system. 

In  the  first  place,  regular  troops  may  and  frequently  will  be  dis- 
patched on  special  missions  before  the  citizen  soldiery  is  called  out. 
If  the  normal  division  organization  iacludes  both  classes  of  forces, 
every  time  the  regular  troops  are  detached  to  perform  their  special 
functions  one  or  more  of  the  divisions  of  the  normal  organization  will 
be  disrupted.  Again,  while  trained  volunteers  will  be  fully  effective 
in  war,  it  can  not  be  disputed  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  regular 
troops  will  have  more  training,  greater  endurance,  and  therefore 
higher  maneuvering  velocity.  But  a  division  is  a  fundamental  army 
unit.  If  the  regulars  are  formed  in  separate  divisions,  we  will  have 
a  small  force  with  the  endurance  and  velocity  necessary  for  the 
sudden  strategic  enterprises  which  determine  the  initiative  in  war. 
These  divisions  can  move  at  once  and  may  even  be  put  in  a  favorable 
initial  position  for  striking  a  blow  at  the  very  outbreak  of  war.  They 
can  be  quietly  concentrated  in  many  cases  before  diplomatic  and 
political  conditions  justify  the  calling  out  the  National  Guard  or 
volunteers.  But  if  these  forces  are  the  component  parts  of  mixed 
divisions  they  can  not  move  as  divisions  at  all,  until  the  citizen 

1  The  division  is  the  fundamental  army  unit  in  which  the  several  arms  are  combined  for  joint  action 
in  the  field.  It  is  essentially  a  small  army  complete  in  itself  and  capable  of  independent  action.  Larger 
forces,  such  as  field  armies,  are  simply  aggregations  of  two  or  more  divisions,  with  such  additional  aux- 
iliaries as  may  be  required  for  the  particular  terrain  and  mission. 

The  details  of  division  organization  are  different  in  different  countries,  but  the  essential  idea  is  that  a 
division  is  a  force  of  infantry  provided  with  a  proper  proportion  of  field  artillery  and  cavalry  and  sup- 
ported by  certain  special  units  which  are  concerned  with  the  special  problems  of  field  engineering,  com- 
munication, transportation,  supply,  and  sanitation.    In  the  United  States  it  is  composed  as  follows: 

Division  headquarters. 

3  Infantry  brigades  of  3  regiments  each. 

1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 

1  brigade  of  Field  Artillery  (2  regiments). 

1  pioneer  battalion  of  Engineers. 

1  field  battalion  of  Signal  troops. 

Sanitary  troops  organized  into  4  field  hospitals  and  4  ambulance  companies. 

1  ammunition  column. 

1  supply  train. 

1  pack  train. 


14  MILITABY  POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES. 

soldier  contiagents  of  the  divisions  are  embodied,  and  when  they  do 
move,  the  velocity  and  endurance  of  the  mixed  divisions  will  be 
determined  by  the  condition  of  their  newly  mobilized  elements. 
Under  such  an  organization  it  will  be  impossible  to  utilize  the  special 
qualities  of  the  highly  trained  nucleus,  except  at  the  expense  of  dis- 
rupting the  normal  organization  at  the  very  outbreak  of  war. 

It  is  presumed  that  the  main  reason  for  suggesting  the  placing  of 
regiments  of  citizen  soldiery  in  brigades  with  regular  regiments,  or 
the  placing  of  citizen  soldier  brigades  in  divisions  with  regular  bri- 
gades, is  to  give  raw  troops  the  example  of  trained  troops  on  the 
march  and  in  battle.  This  will  undoubtedly  be  an  advantage  in 
special  cases,  but  it  should  not  be  made  the  basis  of  permanent 
organization.  It  should  be  our  policy  to  develop  our  citizen  soldiers 
in  peace,  so  that  they  will  no  longer  be  raw  troops  when  they  meet 
the  enemy.  But  the  acceptance  of  this  policy  will  not  preclude  the 
adoption  of  special  measures  to  meet  special  occasions  where  raw 
troops  must  be  employed  to  the  best  advantage.  Even  on  the  defen- 
sive, where  untrained  troops  have  always  shown  to  the  best  advan- 
tage, it  would  seem  that  regular  troops  should  not  be  completely 
dispersed  in  the  trenches,  but  should  be  used  as  a  reserve  to  repulse 
the  main  attack  or  to  make  an  offensive  counterstroke  if  an  oppor- 
tunity offers.  Jackson's  troops  at  New  Orleans  were  able  to  hold 
an  intrenched  position  with  protected  flanks,  but  he  had  no  troops 
with  sufficient  organization  or  training  to  complete  the  victory  by  a 
vigorous  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy. 

We  may  therefore  accept  the  following  general  principles  as  the 
basis  of  correct  organization  of  our  mobile  forces: 

1.  The  mobile  elements  of  the  Regular  Army  should  have  a  divi- 
sional organization  in  time  of  peace.  This  requires  that  it  be  organ- 
ized in  tactical  divisions,  even  if  these  divisions  be  incomplete  and 
insufficient  in  number.  Even  a  small  army  should  be  correctly 
organized  as  an  army. 

2.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  give  a  divisional  organization 
to  the  organized  citizen  soldiery  in  time  of  peace.  If  our  citizen 
soldiers  ever  go  to  war,  they  must  be  organized  into  divisions  before 
they  can  be  employed  effectively  against  the  enemy.  In  order  to 
employ  them  promptly,  every  possible  detail  of  this  organization 
should  be  settled  in  time  of  peace. 

Whenever  it  becomes  necessary  to  reenforce  the  Regular  Army  and 
the  National  Guard  by  volunteer  organizations,  it  is  important  that 
they  should  be  prepared  for  effective  service  in  the  minimum  of  time. 
This  requires  that  they  be  formed  by  trained  officers  acting  under 
prearranged  plans.  It  is  believed  that  this  can  best  be  accomplished 
by  forming  the  new  organizations  as  United  States  Volunteers  under 
a  national  volunteer  law. 


MILITABY  POLICY  OF   UNITED   STATES.  15 

So  long  as  our  National  Guard  is  organized  under  the  militia  clause 
of  the  Constitution  it  will  be  impracticable  to  provide  Federal  divi- 
sion commanders  in  time  of  peace.  But  under  the  power  to  organize 
and  inspect  the  militia  it  would  seem  feasible  to  organize  definite 
districts,  to  encourage  the  formation  of  the  necessary  units,  and  to 
give  each  division  an  inspection  staff,  through  which  the  war  prepara- 
tion can  be  kept  up  in  peace. 

Each  division  district  should  contain  a  complete  division  and  all  of 
the  plans  for  its  mobilization,  supply,^  and  concentration  should  be 
prepared  in  peace  and  continually  corrected  to  date.  This  can  only 
be  accomplished  by  assigning  trained  officers  to  arrange  the  details 
of  organization  under  the  supervision  of  the  General  Staff,  which  is 
intrusted  by  law  with  plans  for  war.  Under  present  conditions  it 
would  be  necessary  to  organize  the  fundamental  war  units  after 
mobilization.  The  War  College  can  and  has  prepared  plans  for  such 
mobilization,  but  in  the  absence  of  a  definite  policy  embodied  in  the 
law  there  is  no  assurance  that  such  plans  can  be  carried  into  effect. 
Solid  and  stable  arrangements  for  mobilization  can  not  be  based  on  a 
hypothetical  policy.  Until  there  is  a  legalized  system  our  actual 
mobilization  will  depend  upon  political  conditions  at  the  time  of  the 
crisis.  Gaps  in  our  legislation  will  be  filled  in  haste  and  no  human 
agency  will  be  able  to  predict  what  the  law  will  be.  Our  traditional 
theory  of  a  small  Regular  Army  and  a  great  war  army  of  citizen 
soldiers  is  not  yet  embodied  as  a  definite  institution.  The  mobiliza- 
tion of  our  citizen  soldiery  to-day  would  not  result  in  a  weU-knit 
national  army.  It  would  be  an  uncoordinated  army  of  50  allies, 
with  all  of  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  allied  forces,  emphasized  by 
the  unusual  number  of  the  allies. 

Reference  Books. 

1.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States.  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen. 
Emory  Upton,  United  States  Army.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

2.  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United 
States,  General  Staff  Report.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

3.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  United  States  Army.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.  C. 

1  The  supply-depot  system  should  be  extended  so  that  the  materiel  and  equipment  necessary  to  equip 
any  organization  to  war  strength  would  be  centrally  stored  within  the  division  district.  Requisitions 
should  be  filled  from  these  depots  and  the  stores  issued  replaced,  so  that  a  minimum  of  deterioration  would 
result.  The  ideal  condition  would  be  to  have  this  additional  war  equipment  actually  in  the  hahds  of 
organizations,  but  this  can  not  be  accomplished  generally  with  the  National  Guard  until  adequate  storage 
facilities  have  been  supplied. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  RESERVE  SYSTEM. 


1.  Maintenance  of  Strength  in  War. 

An  army  is  an  expensive  macliine  maintained  in  order  to  support 
national  interests  in  time  of  emergency.  The  economic  efficiency  of 
an  army  should  therefore  be  measured  by  the  effective  fighting  power 
which  it  is  proposed  to  develop  and  maintain  in  war.  It  must  not 
only  be  able  to  develop  a  high  fighting  efficiency  at  the  outbreak  of 
war,  but  it  must  be  able  to  maintain  that  efficiency  during  the  progress 
of  the  campaign.  As  soon  as  war  begins  military  forces  are  subject 
to  heavy  losses,  and  unless  means  are  definitely  provided  for  replacing 
these  losses  the  mihtary  machine  will  immediately  deteriorate. 
The  losses  in  war  are  not  only  the  losses  in  battle,  but  losses  due  to 
disease  and  losses  due  to  the  hardship  of  campaign.  The  Prussian 
Guard  Corps  in  its  marches  to  Sedan  lost  5,000  men  on  the  march 
alone.  It  was  necessary  for  the  corps  to  arrive  at  the  battle  field 
in  time,  and  that  required  a  velocity  of  march  that  was  more  des- 
tructive than  battle.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  soldiers  in 
this  force  were  trained  soldiers  and  that  the  guard  corps  arrived  and 
fought  at  Sedan  in  spite  of  its  march  losses.  A  force  of  soft  or  raw 
ttoops  could  not  have  arrived  at  all.  Careful  training  is  necessary 
to  prepare  troops  for  war;  but  it  must  be  recognized  that  wastage 
will  occur  and  that  if  a  really  effective  force  is  to  be  maintained 
trained  men  must  be  suppHed  to  replace  this  wastage. 

It  is  the  experience  of  modern  warfare  that  any  given  unit  loses  at 
least  50  per  cent  of  its  strength  in  the  first  six  months  of  war.  If  this 
loss  is  not  replaced,  there  is  50  per  cent  deterioration  in  the  power 
of  the  unit;  and  if.  it  is  replaced  by  raw  men  the  quahty  of  the  force 
as  a  highly  trained  team  is  destroyed. 

This  problem  has  an  important  economic  aspect  that  has  been 
ignored  throughout  our  military  history.  Military  forces  are  main- 
tained at  great  expense  through  long  periods  of  peace  in  order  to  meet 
a  brief  emergency  in  war.  Sound  economics,  therefore,  demands  that 
the  peace  expenditure  be  justified  by  unquestioned  war  efficiency. 
A  company  of  infantry  with  three  officers  should  contain  the  maxi- 
mum number  of  trained  riflemen  that  three  capable  officers  can 
command.  This  maximum  appears  to  be  about  150  men;  but  if  the 
company  starts  in  the  campaign  with  150  men  the  natural  wastage 
16 


MILITABY  POLICY  OF   UNITED  STATES.  17 

of  war  will  immediately  reduce  it  below  that  number.  If  the  vacan- 
cies are  not  filled,  it  ceases  to  be  an  economical  company,  because 
under  these  conditions  we  have  a  less  number  of  men  than  three 
trained  officers  should  control;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  vacancies 
are  filled  by  untrained  men,  the  company  ceases  to  be  a  trained  team, 
as  under  these  conditions  the  three  officers  can  not  effectively  com- 
mand 150  men  in  action. 

The  United  States  is  the  only  Nation  that  has  no  scientific  means 
of  meeting  this  situation.  In  all  of  our  wars  the  companies  first  sent 
into  the  field  have  dwindled  away  in  strength,  and  as  these  units  have 
dwindled  away  new  levies  under  untrained  officers  have  been  organ- 
ized. The  result  has  been  that  our  wars  have  been  long  and  pro- 
tracted and  attended  by  great  sacrffices  of  blood  and  treasure.  Each 
battle  has  generally  been  followed  by  a  period  of  inactivity.  Such 
an  army  has  no  power  to  keep  up  persistent  military  activity. 

Without  some  solution  of  this  problem  there  can  be  no  definite 
military  organization.  The  organization  of  divisions  and  other 
higher  military  units  is  based  on  the  principle  that  the  three  arms 
should  be  combined  in  definite  proportions.  The  infantry  division 
is  differently  organized  in  different  countries,  but  in  all  countries  it 
consists  of  from  10,000  to  15,000  infantrymen,  with  from  4  to  6 
field  guns  per  thousand  rifles,  and  with  similar  definite  proportions  of 
cavalry,  engineers,  signal  troops,  and  other  auxifiaries.  The  infantry 
strength  is  the  basis  of  organization.  In  every  army  except  our 
own  the  number  of  infantrymen  is  definite  and  fixed,  because  means 
of  replacing  losses  are  provided  in  time  of  peace.  With  us,  however, 
the  infantry  strength  is  an  absolute  variable.  We  can  only  predict 
that  the  effective  strength  of  each  unit  will  fall  after  war  begins. 
Under  these  conditions  the  division  is  not  a  contiauing  unit.  Its 
components  are  fluid  and  indefinite,  and  there  can  be  no  stable 
organization  under  such  conditions. 

2.  The  Solution  of  the  Problem. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  is  very  simple,  and  it  is  a  significant 
fact  that  the  same  solution  has  been  adopted  in  all  modern  armies. 
It  is  only  necessary  to  provide  that  a  man's  army  service  shall  consist 
of  two  periods,  one  period  with  the  colors  ^  and  the  other  a  period  of 
war  obfigation  for  a  Hmited  time  after  leaving  active  service.  Under 
these  circumstances  when  war  is  declared  the  active  army  is  at  once 
sent  into  the  field  and  the  former  soldiers  having  a  war  obligation  are 
assembled  in  depots,  where  they  can  be  forwarded  to  the  front  as 

1  The  period  with  the  colors,  or  training  period,  should  only  be  long  enough  to  effect  that  purpose.  The 
shorter  this  period  the  larger  number  of  men  pass  annually  into  the  reserves.  To  keep  men  with  the  colors 
after  they  have  become  trained,  except  as  instructors,  is  both  time  and  reserve  persormel  lost,  provided 
sufficient  recruits  are  obtainable  to  maintain  always  an  adequate  peace  strength. 


18  MILITAKY  POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES. 

needed.  At  the  same  time  raw  recruits  are  enlisted  and  trained  at 
the  depot.  As  losses  occur  at  the  front  they  are  filled  first  by  for- 
warding trained  men  from  the  depot,  and  if  the  number  of  these  is 
sufiicient  new  recruits  are  not  forwarded  until  after  they  Lave  had 
a  sufficient  period  of  training.  The  result  is  that  even  in  a  long  war, 
which  would  ultimately  require  the  services  of  thousands  of  raw 
recruits,  it  is  so  arranged  that  no  man  goes  to  the  front  until  he  is 
trained  for  active  service  and  sufiiciently  hardened  and  disciplined 
to  bear  the  stress  of  modern  war.  Under  such  a  system  the  full 
energy  of  military  activity  can  be  maintained  up  to  the  limit  of  avail- 
able recruits.  Each  unit  works  at  its  maximum  efficiency,  and  the 
war  power  of  the  nation  is  developed  with  a  minimum  expenditure  of 
life  and  money. 

This  is  not  only  sound  military  policy  but  sound  economy,  as  it 
I  insures  a  reasonable  preparedness  for  war,  interferes  to  the  least 
i  extent  with  the  civil  and  industrial  pursuits  of  the  individual;  in  fact, 
sends  him  back  to  civil  life  a  more  valuable  industrial  factor  because 
of  his  better  physique,  his  improved  mental  and  physical  discipline, 
I  and  with  a  greater  respect  for  the  flag,  law  and  order,  and  his  superiors. 
It  is  in  accord  with  our  institutions  and  ideals,  in  that  it  gives  us  the 
trained  citizen  soldier  with  the  minimum  of  time  taken  from  his 
industrial  career.  It  keeps  our  officers  alert  and  progressive  and  it 
gives  us  back  of  the  first  line,  consisting  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the 
militia,  a  body  of  trained  soldiers  ready  for  immediate  service,  10  of 
whom  can  be  maintained  for  the  cost  of  1  man  with  the  colors. 
In  brief,  short  service  and  few  reenlistments,  except  noncommissioned 
officers  and  a  few  skilled  privates,  with  its  concentrated  progressive 
instruction  and  resulting  passing  through  the  Army  and  return  to 
civil  and  industrial  pursuits  of  as  many  men  as  possible,  means  pre- 
j)aredness  for  war  at  a  minimum  of  expense  and  by  means  in  accord- 
ance with  our  ideas.  This  principle  has  been  carried  out  with  the 
greatest  success  in  Switzerland,  where  the  available  men  of  the 
country  have  undergone  thorough  military  training  with  a  minimum 
degree  of  interruption  oi  their  civil  pursuits;  here  we  have  a  popula- 
tion which  is  trained  for  war  under  conditions  which  afford  a  striking 
example  of  what  can  be  accomplished  by  short  service  with  the 
colors,  thorough  but  concentrated  instruction,  and  the  return  of  the 
instructed  man  to  his  regular  occupation,  ready  to  respond  whenever 
called  upon.  Long  service  with  the  colors,  with  the  encouragement 
of  reenlistment,  means  an  army  a  large  portion  of  which  is  serving  for 
retirement  and  has  passed  the  age  of  greatest  physical  activity  and 
resistance.  Its  value  as  a  field  force  has  fallen  off.  At  the  same  time, 
due  to  long  service,  the  per  capita  cost  is  much  greater  than  that  of  a 
short-term  army,  on  account  of  the  increase  in  the  rate  of  pay.  Most 
of  the  men  who  leave  such  a  force  do  so  because  of  disability  or  by 


MILITAKY   POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES.  19 

retirement  for  age.  There  is  little  or  no  material  for  a  reserve. 
Such  an  army  represents  the  maximum  cost  and  a  relatively  low 
degree  of  efficiency;  and  the  effect  upon  both  officers  and  men  is 
deadening,  progress  stops,  and  inertia  results.  This  has  been  the 
history  of  long-service  armies  in  all  countries. 

3.  Power  of  Expansion. 

But  while  one  of  the  primary  and  necessary  functions  of  a  reserve 
system  is  to  replace  losses  during  the  period  required  for  the  training 
of  raw  recruits,  the  principal  function  is  to  furnish  the  trained  men 
necessary  to  pass  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing.  If  we  have  a  reserve 
of  trained  men  upon  whom  we  can  count  in  war,  it  is  possible  greatly 
to  reduce  the  cost  of  the  military  estabUshment  by  giving  it  a  mini- 
mum peace  strength.  Under  our  system  our  units  are  maintained  in 
peace  at  considerably  less  than  war  strength,  but  there  are  no  means 
of  expanding  to  the  war  strength  except  by  the  absorption  of  un- 
trained men.  In  every  other  modern  army  the  economical  peace 
strength  is  maintained  without  loss  of  war  efficiency  because  trained 
reserves  are  available  for  a  prompt  expansion  with  trained  men. 

The  effect  of  the  reserve  system  on  the  cost  of  peace  establish- 
ments can  be  illustrated  in  the  following  way:  Let  us  suppose  that 
we  require  a  regular  army  of  100,000  men  on  the  outbreak  of  war 
and  that  we  propose  to  maintain  this  force  in  fuU  effectiveness 
throughout  the  campaign.  This  requires  that  means  should  be  pro- 
vided for  avoiding  a  deterioration  of  the  force  due  to  the  absorption 
of  raw  recruits  to  replace  the  ffi-st  losses  of  the  campaign.  It  may  be 
predicted  that  the  losses  will  be  50  per  cent,  or  50,000  men,  in  the 
first  six  months,  but  before  the  expiration  of  six  months,  if  we  begin 
training  recruits  at  once,  some  of  the  new  men  will  be  prepared  to  go 
to  the  front.  We  may,  therefore,  adopt  a  factor  of  safety  of  25  per 
cent  instead  of  50  per  cent  and  assume  that  the  maintenance  of 
100,000  men  wiU  require  an  initial  organized  strength  of  125,000  men 
if  there  be  no  reserves.  Under  conditions  prevaiHng  in  the  United 
States  this  force  would  cost  probably  $800  per  man,  or  $100,000,000 
per  year. 

But,  if  we  had  a  system  of  reserves,  the  same  effective  war  strength 
could  be  maintained  at  a  greatly  reduced  cost.  If  the  military  estab- 
lishment comprised  75,000  men  with  the  colors  and  50,000  men  with 
the  reserves,  its  cost  would  not  exceed  $65,000,000  per  year,  and  yet 
its  war  effectiveness  would  be  just  as  great  as  the  more  expensive 
force  without  the  reserves. 

The  economic  effect  of  a  reserve  system,  therefore,  is  to  reduce  the 
per  capita  cost  of  any  given  army,  at  the  same  time  assuring  maximum 
effectiveness  in  war.     If  we  do  not  have  reserves,  we  are  committed 


20  MILITARY  POLICY  OP  UNITED   STATES. 

to  a  policy  of  maximum  cost.  It  has  been  urged  that  a  reserve  sys- 
tem for  the  Kegular  Army  is  essentially  foreign  to  our  institutions 
and  connected  in  some  way  with  compulsory  miUtary  service.  It  is 
true  that  the  nations  having  a  system  of  compulsory  service  also 
have  a  reserve  system,  but  it  is  also  true  that  Great  Britain  regards 
her  regular  army  reserve  as  an  indispensable  part  of  her  system  of 
voluntary  service.  Great  Britain  did  not  adopt  the  reserve  system 
until  after  her  army  broke  down  in  the  Crimean  War  because  reserves 
were  lacking.  Her  highly  trained,  long-service  army  almost  imme- 
diately melted  away.  There  was  no  way  of  renewing  its  strength 
except  with  untrained  men.  She  found  that  without  reserves  her 
Army  was  not  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  war. 

The  provision  of  a  regular  army  reserve  is  purely  a  business  propo- 
sition. The  econonjic  value  of  the  reserve  does  not  depend  in  any 
way  upon  its  size.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  can  develop  a  sufficient 
reserve,  but  even  a  small  reserve  will  reduce  the  per  capita  cost  of 
the  Army  and  increase  its  effectiveness. 

If  we  had  had  only  6,000  men,  that  number  would  have  been  suf- 
ficient to  have  raised  the  recent  San  Antonio  maneuver  division  to 
war  strength.  If  we  should  have  enough  to  replace  the  initial  losses 
of  war,  we  would  be  assured  of  sufficient  time  to  train  and  harden 
raw  recruits  before  forwarding  them  to  the  front.  If  we  should  have 
enough  more  to  give  us  some  power  of  expansion,  we  would  be  able 
to  reduce  the  per  capita  cost  of  our  peace  establishment  to  a  minimum 
without  loss  of  war  efficiency. 

The  necessity  for  initiating  steps  for  the  provision  of  a  reserve  of 
officers  quahfied  to  serve  as  company  officers  of  reserves  or  volunteers 
is  also  of  great  importance,  and  one  which  should  receive  the 
serious  attention  of  the  department.  It  is  thought  that  it  would  be 
practicable  to  select  from  the  graduating  classes  of  those  military 
schools  where  we  have  officers  of  the  Army  as  mihtary  instructors 
and  from  selected  men  of  the  students  mihtary  instruction  camps 
lately  organized  500  men  each  year,  who  could  be  commissioned  as 
second  lieutenants  in  the  different  line  branches  of  the  Regular 
Army  for  a  period  of  one  year,  to  receive  the  full  pay  and  allowances 
of  a  second  Heutenant,  to  be  junior  to  all  second  Heutenants  of  the 
regular  estabhshment,  and  to  be  discharged  at  the  end  of  one  year 
with  a  certificate  of  proficiency,  if  they  merit  it,  as  company,  troop, 
or  battery  officers  of  volunteers  or  reserves.  It  is  beheved  a  propo- 
sition of  this  kind  on  the  part  of  the  Government  would  meet  with  a 
generous  response  and  that  it  is  a  practicable  way  of  providing  a 
reserve  of  officers.  The  results  obtained  would  justify  the  expense. 
It  is  not  unhke  the  methods  pursued  in  foreign  countries  to  provide 
a  corps  of  reserve  officers.     One  thing  is  certain:    We  shall  require 


MILITAKY   POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES.  21 

many  thousands  of  officers,  in  addition  to  those  of  the  regular  estab- 
lishment, as  officers  of  volunteers  and  reserves  in  case  of  war,  and 
steps  should  be  taken  to  provide  them  in  time  of  peace. 

The  great  losses  in  the  early  periods  of  all  our  wars  caused  from 
sickness,  lack  of  sanitary  precautions,  faulty  tactics,  etc.,  is  charge- 
able directly  to  the  inexperienced  officers  placed  in  command.  It  is 
of  vital  import  to  every  mother  and  father  of  a  young  man  as  well 
as  to  the  Nation,  to  provide  means  to  remedy  such  a  state  of  affairs 
before  it  is  too  late. 

We  are  still  without  an  adequate  reserve  system  either  of  officers 
or  men.  Congress  did,  however,  in  the  Army  appropriation  act  of 
August  24,  1912,  establish  an  Army  reserve  built  upon  an  enlistment 
period  of  seven  years,  of  which  either  three  or  four  years,  at  the 
will  of  the  soldier  is  spent  with  the  colors.  This  is  a  great  step 
forward,  as  it  is  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  our  country  that  the 
principle  of  reserves  has  been  recognized. 

Its  principal  defect,  however,  is  the  equal  length  or  longer  service 
period  with  the  colors  than  in  the  reserve.  This  results  in  a  greater 
length  of  time  to  accumulate  a  sufficient  number  and  at  the  end  of  a 
certain  period  a  fixed  maximum  obtains. 

A  much  better  division  seems  to  be  equal  periods  of  three  years  each 
with  the  colors  and  in  the  reserves  with  the  provision  that  a  soldier 
may,  if  he  so  desires  and  with  the  certificate  of  his  company  com- 
mander that  he  is  proficient,  be  discharged  after  the  completion  of 
one  year's  service  (thus  leaving  ^ye  years  in  the  reserves),  thereby 
creating  a  growing  reserve  force. 

The  bounty  now  provided  for  by  this  same  act  in  case  of  war  to 
those  who  enhst  is  a  most  objectionable  feature.  It  puts  a  premium 
on  a  discharged  soldier  not  enlisting  in  the  reserves  and  was  proved 
to  be  most  expensive  and  conducive  to  desertions  when  it  was  adopted 
during  the  Civil  War. 

This  bounty  system  would  not  be  necessary  with  adequate  reserves 
provided  for  by  proper  laws. 


CONSIDERATIONS  DETERMINING  THE  STRENGTH,  COM- 
POSITION, AND  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


1.  Political  conditions  affecting  our  country  have  changed  very 
materially  in  the  past  20  years,  but  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the 
development  of  our  land  forces  has  kept  pace  with  these  changing 
conditions.  Until  quite  recently  our  people  have  been  almost  wholly 
occupied  with  the  task  of  overrunning  our  continental  possessions 
and  taking  fuU  possession  of  them.  The  Regular  Army  has  been  the 
forerunner  of  this  movement,  and  has  been  organized,  distributed, 
and  trained  for  the  requirements  thus  involved.  This  has  kept  the 
bulk  of  the  Regular  Army  scattered  in  small  units  in  our  western 
country.  Conquest  and  settlement  have  been  fairly  completed  now, 
however,  and  the  civil  authorities  are  capable  of  maintaining  orderly 
conditions  as  well  in  one  part  of  our  country  as  in  another.  If  domes- 
tic questions  were  still  the  only  ones  that  claimed  serious  attention, 
it  would  seem  that  to  deal  with  such  questions  only  the  Army  should 
be  distributed  more  equitably  with  respect  to  density  of  population. 

But  gradually  our  external  problems  have  been  assuming  larger 
and  larger  proportion.  While  we  were  expanding  other  nations 
have  been  doing  the  like,  and  within  the  past  few  years  it  is  found 
that  practically  the  whole  earth  is  now  divided  up  among  the  prin- 
cipal nations  and  held  by  them  either  as  actual  possessions  or  as 
spheres  of  influence.  Hitherto  the  interests  of  nations  or  of  small 
groups  of  nations  have  been  more  or  less  local.  But  due  to  this  world- 
wide expansion  the  contact  between  great  nations  and  races  has 
already  become  close.  It  tends  to  become  continually  closer,  due 
to  the  increase  of  population  and  national  needs,  and  due  especially 
to  the  vastly  increased  f acihties  for  intercommunication.  With  this 
close  contact  thus  so  recently  estabUshed  comes  a  competition — com- 
mercial, national,  and  racial — ^whose  ultimate  seriousness  current 
events  already  enable  us  to  gauge.  Since  our  conflict  with  Spain 
in  1898  practically  aU  of  the  principal  nations  of  the  earth  have 
either  been  actively  engaged  in  war  or  else  brought  to  the  verge  of 
actual  war.  The  evidence  is  clear  that  the  nations  and  races  capable 
of  maintaining  and  protecting  themselves  are  the  only  ones  who  can 
flourish  in  this  world  competition. 

We  have  been  drawn  from  our  state  of  isolation  and  are  inevi  tably 
involved  in  this  competition.  We  must  consider  what  preparation 
22 


MILITARY  POLICY   OF   UNITED   STATES.  23 

we  will  make  to  meet  this  change  in  our  national  situation.  It  may- 
be said  that  we  claim  the  undisturbed  enjoyment  of  our  possessions 
at  home  and  the  protection  of  our  interests  abroad.  Our  military- 
requirements  may  then  be  summed  up  as  follows:  (1)  To  secure  our 
home  country  from  invasion;  (2)  to  protect  our  foreign  interests; 
(3)  to  maintain  domestic  peace  and  good  order.  Our  forces  should 
be  proportioned,  organized,  and  trained  to  meet  these  requirements. 

1.  Estimate  of  the  Land  Forces  Needed  in  the  United  States. 

Our  requirements  in  the  way  of  land  forces  are  certain  to  change 
as  the  years  go  on,  but  in  the  light  of  present-day  conditions  it  is 
estimated  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  with  a  first-class  power  we 
should  be  capable  of  mobilizing  at  once  in  the  United  States  an 
effective  force  of  460,000  mobile  troops  and  42,000  Coast  Artillery; 
that  this  is  the  minimum  number  of  first-line  troops  necessary;  and 
that  to  augment  this  force  and  replace  its  losses  we  should  have  plans 
made  for  raising  immediately  an  additional  force  of  300,000  men. 

To  meet  requirements  less  vital  than  a  great  national  war — as, 
for  example,  the  sending  of  expeditionary  forces  to  protect  certain 
foreign  interests — it  may  be  presumed  that  we  would  draw  upon  the 
forces  thus  enumerated;  and  as  in  the  Hght  of  our  recent  experiences 
we  can  not  possibly  foretell  to  what  places  expeditions  may  have  to 
be  sent  nor  what  numbers  will  be  required,  all  of  these  forces  should 
be  available  for  service  anywhere. 

2.  Regular  and  Volunteer  Troops. 

The  Regular  Army  contingent  of  this  total  mobile  force  at  home 
should  be  sufficient  to  provide  an  expeditionary  force  capable  of 
acting  with  the  utmost  promptness  and  decision,  and  sufficient  to 
furnish  a  training  nucleus  for  the  volunteer  troops  in  peace  and  a 
stiff enuig  element  in  war.  To  meet  conditions  we  can  now  foresee  it  is 
beheved  the  Regular  Army  should  comprise  four  complete  divisions 
and  that  it  should  furnish  as  extradivisional  troops  a  division  of 
Cavalry  and  the  quota  of  Heavy  Field  Artillery,  Engineers,  Signal, 
and  sanitary  troops  appropriate  for  one  field  army.  On  this  basis  the 
regular  contingent  of  mobile  troops  within  the  United  States  proper 
when  raised  to  war  strength  would  comprise  about  112,000  men. 
The  remaining  348,000  mobile  troops  would  be  made  up  of  citizen 
soldiers  organized  in  divisions  and  in  field  army  auxiliaries. 

The  regular  contingent  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  the  United 
States  should  comprise  26,500  men  when  on  war  footing,  leaving 
21,000  to  be  furnished  by  the  citizen  soldiery.  These  figures  are 
based  on  a  complete  regular  personnel  for  mine  companies  and  50 
per  cent  personnel  of  regulars  for  gun  companies  for  authorized 
armament. 


A  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

As  war  is  but  a  phase  of  international  politics,  so  military  policy 
is  but  a  phase  of  international  policy.  In  its  broadest  sense  the  or- 
ganization of  the  land  forces  is  but  a  part  of  the  national  war  organi- 
zation, which  includes  the  organization  of  the  sea  forces  and  of  all 
other  national  resources. 

A  scientific  solution  of  our  military  problem  must  include  a  determi- 
nation and  definition  of  national  policy,  and  the  provision  of  sufiicient 
military  and  naval  forces  to  support  that  policy  against  such  adverse 
interests  as  may  develop  from  time  to  time.  As  several  departments 
of  the  Government  are  concerned  in  the  settlement  of  this  question, 
it  is  obvious  that  a  sound  policy  must  be  predicated  upon  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  the  whole  problem  with  the  view  of  coordinating  and 
balancing  its  several  elements. 

In  order  to  formulate  a  comprehensive  policy  for  the  consideration 
of  Congress,  it  is  believed  that  there  should  be  a  council  of  national 
defense  similar  to  the  one  proposed  in  H.  E,.  1309.  The  function  of 
this  council,  as  defined  in  the  bill,  is  to  '' report  to  the  President,  for 
transmission  to  Congress,  a  general  policy  of  national  defense  and 
such  recommendation  of  measures  relating  thereto  as  it  shall  deem 
necessary  and  expedient." 

The  members  of  the  council,  as  provided  in  the  bill,  are  as  follows : 

The  President  of  the  United  States  (ex  officio  president  of  the 
council) . 

The  Secretary  of  State  (to  preside  in  the  absence  of  the  President). 

The  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Appropriations  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Appropriations  of  the  House  of 
II  epr  esent  a  tives . 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  House  of 
K  epresen  tatives . 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of 
Representatives. 
24 


MILITAKY   POLICY   OF    UNITED   STATES.  25 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  of  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army. 

An  officer  of  the  Navy  not  below  the  rank  of  captain,  to  be  selected 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  president  of  the  Army  War  College. 

The  president  of  the  Navy  War  College. 

It  would  seern  that  through  the  agency  of  this  council  the  problem 
of  national  defense  should  receive  the  joint  consideration  of  all  of  the 
branches  of  the  Government  which  are  responsible  for  its  ultimate 
solution. 


LOCALIZATION  OF  REGIMENTS. 

It  has  been  indicated  that  the  estabhshment  of  permanent  foreign 
garrisons  will  permit  localization  of  the  units  of  the  Regular  Army 
at  home.  This  will  result  in  great  economies  of  transportation  and 
will  lead  to  the  development  of  many  reforms  which  are  almost 
impracticable  so  long  as  the  organizations  of  the  Army  are  shifted 
from  place  to  place.  The  localization  of  the  Army  at  home  will 
faciUtate  the  development  of  a  reserve  system,  for  where  regiments 
are  stationed  in  the  populous  parts  of  the  country  they  will  be  able, 
in  many  cases,  to  keep  in  touch  directly  with  their  reserves,  and  also 
to  obtain  their  recruits  locally.  The  present  recruiting  system  is 
based  on  recruiting  for  a  shifting  army.  The  service  has  been  con- 
ducted with  great  ability  and  meets  actual  conditions,  but  it  is 
wasteful  and  expensive  as  compared  with  a  system  of  local  recruiting 
for  a  localized  army. 

The  dispersion  was  originally  due  to  the  necessity  for  establishing 
the  many  small  posts,  under  whose  protection  has  arisen  the  great 
empire  west  of  the  AUeghanies.  Owing  to  the  small  size  of  our  Army, 
and  the  system  of  peace-strength  companies,  it  followed  that  in 
these  posts  only  small  garrisons  were  possible,  and  as  these  were 
charged  not  only  with  active  operations  against  Indians  in  time  of 
war,  but  the  upkeep  of  the  posts  in  time  of  peace,  it  is  evident  that 
the  force  available,  and  the  character  of  their  duties,  prevented  what 
may  be  called  higher  tactical  training.  This  condition  as  regards 
training  obtains  to  a  great  extent  to-day,  for  while  the  necessity  has 
passed  for  maintaining  the  posts,  in  so  far  as  the  Indian  is  concerned, 
another  factor  has  developed  which  causes  any  attempt  on  the  part 
of  the  War  Department  to  abandon  them  to  be  met  by  a  storm  of 
indignation  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  near-by  towns  and  cities. 
This  factor  is  the  money  spent  by  the  Government  for  the  upkeep, 
and  by  the  soldiers  from  their  pay,  which  is  an  important  item  of 
local  revenue;  as  a  consequence  an  appeal  is  made  to  Congressmen 
and  Senators,  and  in  spite  of  what  the  War  Department  can  do,  the 
order  goes  forth  that  the  post  remaia — so  for  political  expediency  a 
faulty  and  expensive  system  is  perpetuated,  and  the  Army  continues 
to  lack  that  training  which  can  only  be  obtained  by  concentration 
in  large  units,  where  the  higher  problems  of  command  and  supply 
can  be  put  in  daily  practice.  More  than  this,  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  the  cost  of  the  Army  is  increased  one-tenth  by  the  mainte- 
nance of  these  posts,  distant  in  many  cases  from  centers  of  supply, 
each  with  a  complicated  and  expensive  staff  system. 
26 


STUDENTS'  MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  CAMPS. 

1.  In  view  of  the  great  success  of  the  two  experunental  military 
camps  of  instruction  for  students  of  educational  institutions  held 
during  July  and  August  of  the  past  summer,  the  War  Department 
has  decided  to  repeat  them  in  the  ensuing  year. 

2.  The  object  of  the  camp  is,  as  before,  to  give  to  the  young  men 
of  the  country,  who  are  desirous  of  accepting  it,  the  opportunity  for  a 
short  course  in  military  training,  in  order  that  they  may  be  better 
fitted  to  discharge  their  military  duty  to  their  country  should  it  ever 
stand  in  need  of  their  service.  The  time  selected  for  these  camps 
(summer  vacation  period)  is  intended  to  enable  college  men  to  attend 
with  the  least  inconvenience  and  greatest  instructional  advantage  to 
themselves. 

3.  In  addition  to  the  above  patriotic  motive  of  attendance,  there 
are  to  be  considered  the  physical  benefits  derived  by  the  students 
from  the  active,  healthful  outdoor  life  of  a  military  camp  for  the 
summer  vacation,  and  this  at  less  expense  than  is  usually  required 
when  away  from  home.  These  physical  benefits  are  of  great  and 
permanent  value  at  this  student  period  of  their  lives,  when  the  pur- 
suit of  their  studies  during  the  balance  of  the  year  requires  a  certain, 
amount  of  confinement.  There  are  also  the  mutually  broadening 
influences  derived  from  meeting  and  being  intimately  associated 
with  students  of  other  well-known  institutions,  and  the  opportunity 
afforded  for  athletic  training  and  contests,  as  well  as  the  novelty  of 
the  experience  itself,  all  contributing  variety  and  interest  to  the 
program. 

Another  gain  to  the  student  is  a  certain  increase  in  his  economic 
value  due  to  the  increased  business  efiiciency  acquired  through  habits 
of  discipline,  obedience,  self-control,  order,  command,  and  the  study 
of  organization  and  administration  as  applied  in  first-class  modem 
armies. 

4.  The  benefit  of  these  camps  to  the  Nation  is  that  they  foster  a 
patriotic  spirit,  without  which  a  nation  soon  loses  its  virility  and  falls 
into  decay;  they  spread  among  the  citizens  of  the  country  a  more 
thorough  knowledge  of  military  history,  military  policy,  and  military 
needs,  all  necessary  to  the  complete  education  of  a  well-equipped 
citizen  in  order  that  he  may  himself  form  just  and  true  opinions  on 
military  topics. 

As  a  military  asset,  the  value  of  these  camps  is  inestimable.  They 
afford  the  means  of  materially  increasing  the  present  inadequate  per- 
sonnel of  the  trained  or  partially  trained  military  reserves  of  the 
United  States,  and  this  increase  consisting  of  a  class  of  educated  men 

27 


28  MILITARY  POLICY  OF  UNITED   STATES. 

from  which  in  time  of  national  emergency  a  large  proportion  of  the 
volunteer  commissioned  officers  will  probably  be  drawn,  and  upon 
whose  judgment  and  training  at  such  a  time  the  lives  of  many  other 
men  will  in  a  measure  depend. 

The  ultimate  object  sought  is  not  in  any  way  one  of  military  ag- 
grandizement, but  to  provide  in  some  degree  a  means  of  meeting  a 
vital  need  confronting  us  as  a  peaceful  and  unmilitary  people,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  desired  peace  and  prosperity  through  the  only 
safe  precaution,  viz,  more  thorough  preparation  and  equipment  to 
resist  any  e£Port  to  break  such  peace. 

5.  Only  those  will  be  allowed  to  attend  who  are  students  in  good 
standing  of  a  first-class  university,  college,  or  in  the  graduating  class 
at  high  or  preparatory  schools;  recent  university  or  college  graduates, 
and  those  who  have  received  a  satisfactory  oflicial  War  Department 
certificate  of  attendance  at  a  previous  student  camp. 

Applicants  must  be  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  have  declared 
their  intention  of  so  becoming;  18  to  30  years  of  age,  inclusive;  of 
good  moral  character,  and  physically  qualified. 

6.  Students  must  attend  for  the  full  period  of  five  weeks,  unless 
compelled  by  actual  necessity  to  leave  before  that  time.  They  must 
during  this  period  render  themselves  subject  to  the  rules  and  regu- 
lations prescribed  for  the  government  of  the  camp,  the  commanding 
ofiicer  having  authority  to  discontinue  their  attendance,  withhold, 
certificate  or  both,  upon  violation  of  such  ordinances. 

7.  Students  are  required  to  pay  for  their  transportation,  food 
($3.50  per  week),  and  clothing  (about  $5). 

The  Government  provides  all  the  other  necessities  of  camp  life  and 
the  personnel  for  instruction. 

The  theoretical  and  practical  principles  of  tactics  are  taught  as  well 
as  target  practice,  map  making,  marching,  camping,  care  of  troops 
in  the  field,  and  camp  sanitation,  with  talks  by  selected  oflS^cers  on 
field  fortification,  military  bridge  building,  signalling,  demolitions, 
the  organization  and  supply  of  armies,  and  the  military  history  of 
our  country. 

8.  The  camps  will  be  held  for  five  weeks  between  the  early  part  of 
July  and  the  middle  of  August,  the  exact  dates  to  be  decided  upon 
later.  This  plan  meets  with  the  approval  of  all  university  and  college 
authorities  heard  from  on  the  subject,  among  whom  are  the  heads  of 
the  majority  of  the  larger  educational  institutions  in  the  country. 

It  is  heartily  indorsed  by  the  students  attending  last  year's  camp, 
the  greater  part  of  whom  have  expressed  their  intention  of  returning, 
if  possible,  in  the  coming  year;  and  a  number  of  congratulatory  letters 
have  been  received  from  parents,  dwelling  upon  the  physical  benefits 
derived  by  their  sons  from  the  last  camp. 

9.  Applications  for  further  information  or  to  attend  these  camps, 
addressed  to  the  War  Department,  will  be  given  full  consideration. 


STUDENTS'  SOCIETY  OF  THE  NATIONAL  RESERVE  CORPS. 

1.  The  students  attending  tlie  military  instruction  camps,  as  insti- 
tuted by  the  War  Department  during  the  summer  of  1913,  formed 
an  organization,  for  which  they  adopted  the  name  the  Society  of  the 
National  Reserve  Corps  of  the  United  States. 

The  following  gentlemen,  all  of  whom  have  expressed  cordial  inter- 
est in  the  plan  of  holding  these  summer  camps,  have  consented  to  act 
as  advisory  committee  of  the  student  organization : 

J.  G.  Hibben,  president  of  Princeton  University. 

A.  L.  Lowell,  president  of  Harvard  University. 

A.  T.  Pladley,  president  of  Yale  University. 

G.  H.  Denny,  president  of  the  University  of  Alabama. 
H.  B.  Hutchins,  president  of  the  University  of  Michigan. 

E.  W.  Nichols,  president  of  Virginia  Military  Institute. 

B.  I.  Wheeler,  president  of  the  University  of  California. 

J.  H.  Finley,  president  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York. 

H.  S.  Drinker,  president  of  Lehigh  University. 

President  Drinker  was  elected  president  of  the  organization. 

Mr.  George  H.  Gaston,  jr.,  a  student  at  the  camp,  was  elected  secre- 
tary and  treasurer. 

The  following  student-members  of  the  camps  were  elected  an  execu- 
tive committee: 

H.  A.  Murrill,  Virginia  Military  Institute. 

C.  D.  Gentsch,  Western  Reserve  University. 
H.  B.  Perrin,  Yale  University  (graduate). 

F.  R.  Lowell,  Yale  University. 

R.  Guillou,  University  of  California. 

G.  H.  Gaston,  jr.,  Princeton  University. 

2.  At  a  meeting  of  the  college  presidents  forming  the  advisory  com- 
mittee the  following  constitution,  prepared  by  the  students  at  the 
camps,  was  formally  passed  upon  and  adopted,  viz: 

CONSTTTUTION   OF  THE    SOCIETY  OF  THE   NATIONAL   RESERVE   CORPS. 

1.  Being  convinced  of  the  physical  benefit  to  be  derived  from  living  a  part  of  the 
year  in  the  strenuous,  healthful,  open-air  life  of  a  military  camp,  particularly  to  stu- 
dents whose  pursuits  have  kept  them  indoors  and  leading  a  comparatively  inactive 
life  for  considerable  periods,  and  the  knowledge  gained  of  marching,  camping,  care 
of  the  person,  and  camp  sanitation  with  minimum  .expense;  and 

2,  Desiring  to  increase  the  economic  value  and  business  efficiency  of  our  young 
men  by  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  study  the  principles  of  command,  organiza- 
tion and  administration,  and  experience  the  value  of  discipline  obtaining  in  modem 
armies;  and 

29 


30  MILITAEY  POLICY  OF  UNITED  STATES. 

3.  Realizing  that  wars  between  nations  are  liable  to  occur  now  or  in  the  future, 
even  as  they  have  in  the  past;  and 

4.  That  notwithstanding  our  best  efforts  to  preserve  peace  with  right  and  honor 
our  own  country  may  become  involved  in  a  war,  either  of  defense  against  attack  or 
of  offense  against  any  nation  that  may  violate  the  rights  secured  us  under  the  Con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  States;  and 

5.  Knowing  the  above  and  firmly  believing  that  our  present  state  of  preparation 
and  means  of  meeting  such  an, emergency  are  inadequate  and  will  lead  either  to 
disaster  or  to  useless  waste  of  men,  material,  and  money;  and 

6.  Further  knowing  that  the  above  state  of  affairs  should  be  remedied,  and  real- 
izing that  it  is  each  man's  duty  to  his  country  to  do  his  own  proper  share  to  effect 
such  a  remedy; 

7.  We,  the  undersigned  young  men  of  America,  do  hereby  form  and  organize  the 
Society  of  the  National  Reserve  Corps  of  the  United  States  and  do  hereby  pledge 
ourselves,  individually  and  collectively,  from  purely  patriotic  motives,  to  do  our 
utmost  without  hope  of  reward  and  "without  fear  or  favor  to  further  the  objects  of 
said  corps  and  work  for  its  principles  as  set  forth  below: 

The  objects  of  the  Society  of  the  National  Reserve  Corps  will  be: 
(a)  To  perpetuate  the  system  of  students'   military  instruction  camps  and  to 
encourage  a  large  attendance; 
(6)  To  encourage  thorough  knowledge  throughout  the  country  of — 

(1)  Military  policy, 

(2)  Military  history,  and 

(3)  Military  organization — 

and  to  have  these  objects  included  in  the  curriculum  of  the  various  colleges. 

(c)  To  individually  train  ourselves  to  the  best  of  our  ability  to  be  fitted  to  serve 
with  best  effect  in  case  of  need  in  such  capacity  as  our  condition  at  that  time  may 
properly  permit. 

(d)  To  establish  and  support  a  sound  national  military  policy  which  shall  include 
the  maintenance  of  a  highly  efladent  Regular  Army  sufiicient  for  the  peace  needs 
of  the  Nation  and  a  well-organized  and  efficient  militia  each  supported  by  adequate 
reserves. 

Eligible  for  membership: 

Class  A. — Those  men  who  have  attended  one  or  more  students'  military  instruc- 
tion camps  as  organized  by  the  War  Department. 

Class  B. — All  other  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  good  standing  subject  to  rules 
and  by-laws  of  the  society. 

3.  It  is  believed  that  the  above  society  has  in  it  the  seeds  of  a 
movement  of  great  import  to  the  Nation.  The  history  of  our  coun- 
try has  ever  been  that  what  the  people  want  they  can  get,  and  up  to 
the  present  time  their  interest  in  a  policy  of  an  adequate  national 
defense  has  not,  either  through  lack  of  interest  or  force  of  necessity, 
been  brought  sufficiently  to  their  notice. 

4.  It  is  believed  that  this  society  wUl  help  to  accomplish  this,  and 
that  the  dissemination  of  their  teachings  through  the  medium  of 
the  educated  youth  of  the  country  and  by  them  to  the  citizens  at 
large  will  produce  the  desired  result. 


MANUAL  TRAINING,  ETC.,  IN  THE  REGULAR  ARMY. 

Several  sclieines  have  lately  been  proposed  to  institute  in  tlie 
Army  schools  of  application  for  the  learning  of  the  various  mechani- 
cal and  industrial  trades.  This  in  addition  to  the  purely  military 
instruction  and,  as  stated  in  the  proposal,  ^Ho  fill  in  the  idle  moments 
of  a  soldier^ s  life.'' 

These  schemes  all  presuppose  a  continuance  of  the  present  policy 
of  a  long  enlistment  period  with  the  colors  and  realize  that  the 
purely  military  traming  can  be  given  in  a  shorter  period,  thereby 
leaving  a  considerable  amount  of  available  time,  or  else  a  repetition 
of  instruction. 

The  proper  policy,  however,  and  as  previously  pointed  out  under 
''Reserves,"  is  to  stand  for  the  avowed  first  purpose  of  an  army, 
the  establishment  of  an  adequate  defense  of  the  Nation — an  efiicient 
Army,  both  regular  and  militia,  each  with  its  proper  reserves — to 
effect  which  the  enlistment  period  with  the  colors  is  cut  down  to  the 
minimum  amount  necessary  to  learn  the  trade  of  a  soldier  and  an 
intensive  system  of  instruction  established,  it  stands  to  reason  there 
can  in  this  case  be  but  little  time  available  for  other  purposes. 

31 


MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  IN  EDUCATIONAL  INSTITUTIONS. 

1.  Under  section  1225,  Revised  Statutes,  and  amendments  thereto, 
officers  of  the  Regular  Army  are  detailed  as  military  instructors  to 
certain  sclibols,  coHegp^, .  etc*,  that  fulfill  certain  specified  require-, 
ments  as  to  number  of 'students  attending  and  amount  of  instruction 
given  i;i*nliijtur.y  -jsub' jec ts".  . ".   ' '  '^ 

Under  the  Morrill  Act' bJ  July  2,  1862,  certain  land  and  money 
were  donated — 

^Ho  the  endowment,  support,  and  maintenance  of  at  least  one  col- 
lege (in  each  State)  where  the  leading  subject  shall  be,  without 
excluding  other  scientific  and  classical  studies,  and  including  military 
tactics,  to  teach  such  branches  of  learning  as  are  related  to  agriculture 
and  the  mechanic  arts,''  etc. 

2.  Under  the  present  law  there  is  no  specified  standard  of  ihilitary 
instruction  required  and  no  penalty  attached  to  insufficient  or  im- 
proper military  instruction  that  endangers  the  receipt  of  the  annual 
fund  appropriated,  unless  the  following  provision  of  the  act  of  August 
30,  1890,  could  be  construed  as  such,  viz: 

^^If  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  shall  withhold  a  certificate  from 
mij  State  or  Territory  (as  to  whether  such  State  or  Territory  is 
entitled  to  receive  its  share  of  the  appropriation  for  colleges)  of  its 
appropriation,  the  facts  and  reasons  therefor  shall  be  reported  to  the 
President,  and  the  amount  involved  shall  be  kept  separate  in  the 
Treasury  until  the  close  of  the  next  Congress  in  order  that  the  State 
of  Territory  may,  if  it  should  so  desire,  appeal  to  Congress  from  the 
determination  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

'^If  the  next  Congress  shaU  not  direct  such  sum  to  be  paid,  it  shall 
be  covered  into  the  Treasury. 

^^And  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  is  hereby  charged  with  the 
proper  administration  of  this  law.'' 

3.  The  Secretary  of  the  Interior  has  not  under  him  the  necessary 
trained  military  personnel  to  determine,  so  far  as  the  proper  military 
instruction  is  concerned,  whether  or  not  the  intent  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Morrill  Act  regarding  ^'military  tactics"  is  properly  enforced, 
and  does  not  attempt  to  do  so. 

The  War  Department  does  inspect  the  several  colleges  to  which 
Army  officers  are  detailed,  but  has  no  remedy  for  the  enforcement 
of  the  proper  amount  of  military  study  other  than  the  withdrawal 
of  said  officer  in  certain  cases,  the  result  being  that  in  some  colleges 
the  minimum  amount  possible  is  set  aside  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
military  department. 

Efforts  are  now  being  made  to  remedy  the  above  situation,  and  it 
is  hoped  the  results  will  be  satisfactory. 
32 

O 


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^\oO"Ts" 


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WSTACtt 


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DECEIVED 


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Makers 

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PAT.  JAN.  21,  1908 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNffii  UBRARY 


